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SOME QUESTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ARISING FROM
THE RUSSO-JAPANESE

WAR.

V.
War Correspondents, Wireless Telegraphy and Submarne Mines.
By Aios S. HERSHEY,

Associate Professor of European History and Politics, Indiana University.
HE Russo-Japanese War has given rise
to several interesting and important
questions bearing upon the rights and privileges of neutrals in warfare whic'h.are wholly
new and unprecedented in the history of International Law. In dealing with these questions it may be well to call attention to the
fact that the discussion of such topics must
necessarily be more or less tentative in its
nature, inasmuch as we cannot appeal, in
support of our views, to the authority of eminent publicists or jurists or to the force of
precedents in international practice. In the
absence of such guides we must fall back
upon the general or fundamental principles
ui our science or seek for anal.ogous cases in
the history of International Law.
The first of these questions relates to the
rights of war correspondents and the use
of wireless telegraphy in neutral waters.
The head of our State Department must
have been considerably surprised to receive
the following note from Count Cassini, the
Russian ambassador at Washington, on
April 15, 1904. "I am instructed by my Government, in order that there may be no misunderstanding, to inform your Excellency
that the Lieutenant of his Imperial Majesty
in the Far East1 has just made the following
declaration :-In case neutral vessels, having
on board correspondents who may communicate news to the enemy by means of improved apparatus not yet provided for by
existing conventions, should be arrested off
Kwan-tung, or within the zone of operations
Admiral Alexieff

the Russian fleet, such correspondents
shall be regarded as spies, and the vessels
provided with such apparatus shall be seized
as lawful prizes." It is believed that a simihir, if not identical, note was communicated
to the other Powers, 3 which was thus in the
nature of a general notification to, the whole
world. After a careful consideration of this
announcement on the part of the Russian
Government that it proposes to, treat as spies
any newspaper correspondents falling into
its hands who have been engaged in the collection or transmission of news on the high
seas by means of wireless telegraphy, our
Government appears to have wisely decided
to defer action or formal protest until a case
of

2

For the text of this note see the London Times

(weekly ed.) for April 22, 1904. Cf. N. Y. Times
for April i6th. The two versions differ slightly
in phraseology, but not in purport.

This is true, at least in the case of the British
Government. The British note does not seem to
have been given to the Press, but on April 22d,
Earl Percy, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign

Affairs, gave an account of Admiral Alexieff's
order in the House of Commons which differed
from the American version in a very important

He spoke of "correspondents who are
communicating information to the enemy," instead of "who may communicate, etc." "There
is," as Lawrence (War and Neutrality in the Far
respect.

East, p. 85) says in commenting upon this appar-

ent discrepancy, "all the difference in the world
between being in a position to do an act and actually doing it." In the latter case, i. e., if the

war correspondent on board the Haimun had actually communicated news to the Japanese. he

would have been guilty of having performed an
unneutral service for which he would have rendered himself liable by way of penalty to the loss
of his ship and apparatus, although even in this
case, he would not have been subject to the treatment of a spy. We have accepted the American
version and assumed throughout our discussion
that there is no question of unneutral service.
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of violation of neutral or American rights had
actually arisen.'
The Russian note to the Powers appears
to have been provoked by the presence in
the Yellow Sea and adjacent waters of a
British war correspondent equipped with a
IDe Forest wireless telegraph apparatus 2 on
board the Chinese dispatch boat Haimun.
This vessel, which is in the joint service of
the London and New York Times and whicii
flies the British flag, had been cruising about
the Gulf of Pe-Chi-li and adjacent waters as
near to Port Arthur as practicable and was
sendin g its dispatches by means of wireless
telegraphy to a neutral station at the British
port of Wei-hai-Wei whence they were
transmitted to London and thence to New
York. The Times' correspondent declared
that his messages, being in cipher, could not
b;, recorded either by Russian or Japanese
instruments, that they all went to a neutral
cable office, that he had never been in Russian waters, and that all of his dispatches
had been sent either in neutral waters or on
3
the high seas.
'The Russian Foreign Office was notified, however, that "the United States reserves all the
rights she may have under International Law in
the event of any American citizen being affected."
This notification did not involve a protest on the
part of our Government against the Russian
proclamation. The United States Governent is
said to have been the only one to reply to the
Russian note, although this can, of course, not
be a matter of definite knowledge. Russia appears to have given assurances to the British and
American Governments that she did not contemplate any immediate action in respect to the execution of her threat.- It is not definitely known
whether the British Government has made any
representations to Russia in regard to this matter, but Lord Lansdowne is reported to have expressed the opinion that the attitude of Russia is
"'unjustifiable and altogether absurd." See N. Y.
Times for April 22, 1904.
2 Several of the operators are said to have been
Americans.
See his letter in the N. Y. Times for April 1g.
1904. It is worth noting that the Japanese have
also attempted to control, or at least influence
the movements of the Haimun. In a communication printed in the N. Y. Times for May 16th, the
Times' correspondent says that on April I7th he

War is now regarded as an abnormal or
ex ceptional relation between States, and the
presumption, even in time of warfare, is always in favor of the laws of peace and therefore of the rights and privileges of neutrals
in their peaceful relations with each other
and with belligerents. "Unless proof to the
contrary is shown, neutral States and their
subjects are free to do in time of war between other States what they were free to do
in time of universal peace.''4
If we apply this fundamental principle of
the Law of Neutrality to the subject under
discussion, it will at once be seen that not a
Nord can be said in favor ,of this absurd and
monstrous innovation upon the rights of
neutrals. The Russians appear to have defended Admiral Alexieff's order on the
ground that "the correspondent on board the
]-Iaimnu regularly transmitted to Che-Foo intelligence of all the outgoings and ingoings
of the Russian fleet at Port Arthur" and that
"the information thus conveyed might obviously have been of the highest -value to the
Japanese. ' 5
It also appears from Count
Cassini's note that the fact that the use of
received a communication from the British Minister at Tokio to the effect that he was requested
by the Japanese military authorities not to proceed north of the Che-Foo-Che-mul-po line until further notice. He remarks that his position
is difficult in the extreme. He is threatened with
capital punishment by one belligerent and warned
off the high seas and neutral waters by the other.
He chose, however, to submit to the wishes of
Japan out of deference to former courtesies on
the part of the Japanese. These restrictions on
the movements of the Haimin appear subsequently to have been at least partially removed
by Japan
' Lawrence, Principles, p. 474. It is unneces.sary to multiply references upon this general and
fundamental principle of the Law of Neutrality,
which may be regarded as fully established since
the close of the eighteenth century. "Till then
belligerents were. on the whole, more powerful
than neutrals, and were able to carry on their
wars with slight regard to the sanctity of neutral
or the convenience of neutral commerce." Lawrence, p. 475. For the earlier practice and theory, see especially Hall, Pt. IV., c. 2.
territory

From the Novoe Treizya, quoted in the N. Y.

Times for June 8, 1904.
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wireless telegraphy had not been "foreseen
by existing conventions" seemed to the Russian Government to afford ample justification
fort such an unwarranted attack upon the
rights of neutral individuals. In other- words
the presumption is assumed to be in favor of
the rights of belligerents and against the
rights of neutrals-a. total misconception and
reversal of one of the fundamental principles
of modern International Law. Under existing law it would as a matter of fact require
an International Convention to prohibit, or
even to, restrict, the use of wireless telegraphy on the high seas or in neutral territory.
In view of their ever-growing importance,
it is somewhat surprising to note that the
status of war correspondents is one which is
seldom even touched upon by -publicists on
International Law.1 The "Instructions for the

Armies of the Government of the United
States in the Field," prepared by Dr. Francis Lieber and issued by the Secretary of
War in April, 1863, declare that "citizens
w.ho accompany an army for whatever purpose, such as sutlers, editors, or reporters of
journals, or contractors, if captured, may be
'The only publicists amongst those consulted
by the writer who even refer to the status of war
correspondents are Bluntschli (§§594-96 and
notes), Hall (note on p. 404 of 3d ed.), and Lawrence (p. 336). Bluntschli. says that a military occupant (or invader) has the "right to detain persons, who, without belonging to the army and
exercising pacific functions, are dangerous to the
army of occupation," amongst whom he includes
journalists whose opinions are hostile. He is also
of the opinion that non-combatants, e. g., newspaper correspondents, contractors, etc., attached
to an army which has surrendered or to troops
which have been captured, may be made prisoners at least provisionally, but he thinks they
ought not to be retained as prisoners of war unless "their presence in the camp of the enemy
constitutes a support to the latter or a danger to
the Power which has captured them." Hall seems
to think that newspaper correspondents should
only be detained for special reasons. Lawrence
suggests that "probably the worst that could happen to them if captured in civilized warfare would
be expulsion from the lines of the captors."
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t-ade prisoners of war, and be detained as
such." ' 2 This provision was incorporated into the "Rules of Military Warfare" adopted
by the Brussels Conference of 1874.' The
Code adopted by the Institute of International Law at its Oxford session in i88o
merely declares in favor of detention in case
of necessity. It provides that "persons who
follow an army without forming part of it,
such as correspondents of newspapers, sutlers, contractors, etc., on falling into the
power of the enemy, can only be detained for
so long a time as may be required by strict
military necessity."14 The "Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land" adopted by the Hague Conference in
1899, declare that "individuals which follow an
army without directly belonging to it-such
as newspaper correspondents and reporters,
sutlers and contractors-who fall into the
enemy's hands, and whom the latter see fit
to detain, have a right to be treated as prisoners of war, provided they can produce a
certificate from the military authorities of
the army which they were accompanying. ' '
It will thus be seen that, according to existing international practice, the severest
treatment which can possibly be meted out to
a war correspondent captured on belligerent
2 Section
the text of
pendices to
and Snow's

III., §50 of the "Instructions."
For
these Instructions, see e. g., the ApTucker and Wilson's International Laze
Cases.

- " Persons in the vicinity of armies, but who do
not directly form part of them, such as correspondents, newspaper reporters, vivandiers, contractors, etc., may also be made prisoners of war.
These persons should, however, be furnished with
a permit, issued by a competent authority, as well
as with a certificate of identity." Art. 34 of the
Rules of the Brussels Conference. For the English text, see App. III. to Tucker and Wilson.

' Pt. II., §22, of Hall's translation of the Oxford
Code. For text, see App. II. in Wilson and
Tucker. Cf. §2I, of translation in App. to Snow's
Cases. For the French text of the Oxford Code,
see Tableau Gdndrale de l'Institut de Droit Int.,
pp. 173-190.
Art. 13.

See Holls Peace Conference, 148.
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territory, who conducts himself properly and
who has been furnished with the proper credentials, is that to which prisoners of war are
entitled. In no case can he possibly be
treated as a spy. "An individual can only be
considered a spy if, acting clandestinely, ot
.under false pretences, he obtains, or seems to
obtain, information in the zone of operations
of a belligerent, with the intention of comnmvnicating it to the hostile party."' The business of a newspaper correspondent, at least
as usually conducted, answers none of these
requirements. In fact this definition of a spy
adopted by the Hague Conference-expresslv, or at least impliedly, excludes them
from this category.
But it may be said that the use of wireless
telegraphy introduces a new factor into this
problem. War correspondents have hitherto
been more or less subject to control, and it
is clearly within the right of a belligerent
either to exclude them altogether from belligerent territory or to place them under such
supervision as may be necessary in order to
control their actions. But the invention of
wireless telegraphy has made it possible for
them, under certain circumstances, to operate
either on the high seas or on neutral territory 2 to an extent which was impossible before. If the use of wireless telegraphy on the
high seas may be injurious to belligerent
inter e-ts, might we not also conceive case3 in
which it would be equally injurious if operated
'Art.

29 of the

"Regulators

Respecting

the

Laws and Customs of War on Land," adopted by
The Hague Conference. See Holls op. cit., p. 153
Cf. the definitions of a spy contained in the American Instructions (§88), and the Rules of the
Brussells Conference (§19).
They are couched
in terms almost identical with those employed by
The Hague Conference.
2 It
has been reported on newspaper authority
that the Russians have been trying to use the
Chinese port of Che-Foo for the transmission of
wireless messages from Port Arthur. See e. g..
New York Times for June 9 and II, 19o4. This is
a case of the use of neutral territory by a belligerent for a military purpose, but newspaper correspondents might conceivably make similar use
of a neutral station.

on neutral soil? Now would any one go so
far as to maintain that a war correspondent,
operating either by means of wireless telegraphy or any other system on neutral territory, could be seized and treated as a spy, or
even held as a prisoner of war? A belligerent
has undoubtedly the right to,prohibit or prevent the transmission of cable messages (and
wireless telegraphy is only a means of acceleating the transmission of messages) on belligerent territory (including the three mile
limit). So he would also probably have the
right to interrupt submarine telegraphic cables extending between enemy and neutral territory at any point within hi's own, territorial
jurisdiction or within that of the enemy. But
he would have no right to- interfere with subiiarine telegraphic communication between
two neutral territories.'
But in view of the possible injury which
may result to belligerents from the use of
wireless telegraphy on the high seas or on
neutral territory, some concessions should
perhaps be made to military necessity prov;ded neutral rights and interests are not
seriously impaired. Interference with wireless messages on the high seas might under
certain circumstances be permitted to belligerents. as also the seizure and confiscation of
wireless telegraphy apparatus as contraband
of war,4 and neutrals sho ld, certainly refuse
'See Art. 5 of the Naval War Code, prepared
by Captain Stockton of the United States Navy.
and issued as General Orders No. 551 on June
27, I9OO. For text, see App. VI. in Wilson and
Tucker. Cf. the rules on submarine cables
adopted by the Institute of International Law in
Annuaire, XIX.. p. 331.
It may be noted that M. Pillet, Professor of
International Law at the University of Paris, is
quoted as having expressed a similar opinion in
respect to the liability to seizure and confiscation
of wireless telegraphy apparatus as contraband
of war. See Army and Navy Journal for June 4.
1904. The same opinion is expressed in the
Saturday Review for April 23, 1904. It is worthy
of especial notice in this connection that Russia
has placed telephone and telegraph material in
her list of contraband of war.
Lawrence (War and Neutrality in the Far East.
p. 92) suggests that "power should be given by
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to permit -the use of their territory for military purposes.'
The second question relates to the menace
to neutral rights and the danger to the safety
of neutral persons and property which, it
is feared, exists from the placing of submarine mines in Eastern waters.
In the latter part of May it was reported
that the Russians at Port Arthur had sown
the whole strait of Pe-chi-li with floating
blockade mines. "Not only have these diabolical machines been placed off their own
shores and in their own waters, but it -is reported that launches and junks have been
sent out to drop mines at night or in fogs in
international convention to exclude the vessels
of correspondents for a time from any zone of
sea in which important warlike operations were
in process of development." "Each belligerent,"
he says. "should have a right to place an officer
on board a newspaper steamer to act as censor
of its messages, and the penalty for persistent
obstruction and refusal to obey signals should be
capture and confiscation." We do not see the
necessity for such an extension of the rights of
belligerents and encroachment upon the rights
and privileges of neutrals. The phrase, "zone of
warlike operations," is very vague, and the penalty appears to us to be unduly severe. Why
punish an act which is harmless and innocent in
itself by means of a penalty which is usually reserved for those engaging in unneutral service?
' Lawrence (op. cit., p. 200) also properly suggests that neutral Powers ought to prevent the
receipt of messages on their territory from a
blockaded garrison, as in the case of the alleged
Russian communication between Che-Foo and
Port Arthur. He cites the refusal of the British
authorities of a request by the United States for
permission to land a cable at Hong Kong from
Manilla during the Spanish-American War in
1898. on the ground that "to grant such facilities
would be a breach of neutrality."
But it may
be well to call attention to the fact that this refusal to permit the use of neutral territory for
military purpose rests upon a well-established
principle of International Law, and would not apply to the use of neutral cable stations by war
correspondents.
For useful or suggestive discussions or editorials on "War Correspondents and Wireless
Telegraphy," see especially Harper's Weekly for
April 30, 1904; Army and Navy Journal for May 21;
New York Times for April 16-i; London Times
(weekly ed.) for April 22d; A. Maurice Low in
The Forum for July-September, and Sir John
Macdonnell in Nineteenth Century for July, 1904
See also Lawrence, War and Neutrality in the Far

East, pp. 83-93 and pp.

199-202.
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waters likely to be used by the Japanese war
ships and transports. These mines have
orifted into the high seas and Chinese waters
where they constitute the gravest danger to
neutral shipping.' 12 It is feared by experts
that these mines may be a menace to the lives
and property of neutrals for some time to
come, and that they may get out into the
great ocean currents and drift into all or any
portions of the Pacific Ocean.
These charges against the Russians cannot
be said to be fully proven, but there is certainly a strong presumption of carelessness
it the laying of these mines or of negligence
ii controlling them after they were laid. It
is true that our information is unofficial, but
there appears to be sufficient evidence of the
4
'existence c such mines in the open sea.
'Special

cablegram to the London

and

New

York Times, published on May 23, 1904.
See, e. g., The Scientific American for June 4,
1904, and the Army and Navy Journal of the same
date.
The
Haimun claimed
to
have
passed
two
of
these
mines
within
two
miles
of Wei-hai-Wei, i. e., nearly one hundred miles
from Port Arthur, on May 22d.
Twentyone similar mines are said to have been discovered by vessels in various parts of the Gulf of
Pe-chi-li and the Yellow Sea. The correspondent of the London Express at Wei-hai-Wei estimated in the latter part of May that there were
some four hundred mines floating in or near the
Gulf of Pe-Chi-Ii. The Japanese, judging from
newspaper reports, seem to have been kept busy
for some weeks in removing Russian mines from
these waters, but the correspondent of the Chicago Daily News reported the discovery of
a freshly-painted contact mine in the Gulf of
Liaotung as late as June 20th. Insurance rates
in London are said to have risen in consequence
of the increased risks resulting from the fear of
these mines.
See New York Times for May
26, 1904.
The Japanese battleship Hatsuse is generally
supposed to have been blown up by such a mine
on May 15th, at a distance of ten miles from Port
Arthur, although it has also been suggested that
this vessel may possibly have been destroyed by
a Japanese mine or by a mine accidentally adrift.
It has been pointed out that such a disaster might
equally have happened to a neutral trading vessel cruising in those waters. The Russian battleship Petropovlovsk had been destroyed by a Japanese mine on April 13th, but this occurred on the

outer roadstead of Port Arthur, i. e., in territorial
waters.
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Either these mines.were deliberately laid or
set adrift on the high seas, ,orthey were insecurely fastened in territorial waters and
drifted from their anchorage out into the
open sea.1
There appears to have been no official
or semi-official denial of these charges on the
part of the Russian Government, although
they cannot be said to be fully established.
Russians are said to justify such action on
the ground that everything is permissable
in war except those things which are specifically forbidden by convention or International Law. 2 It has also been suggested that,
It may be that the Japanese, too, are not wholly
free from guilt in this matter of laying mines on
the high seas or of negligence in securely fastening them in territorial waters; for it is known
that they have been laying mines for the Russian fleet at several points outside Port Arthur
(whether inside or outside the three-mile limit is
not clearly stated), some of which are said to
have been improperly anchored and found adrift
in April and May. See New York Times for
April 17th and May 20th. But it would be absurd
to suppose that the Japanese would have filled
the Gulf of Pe-ehi-li and adjacent waters with
mines to their own great danger and inconvenience. Indeed, they seem to have been put to no
small expense and effort in freeing these waters
from these obstacles to the freedom of their
novements.
It appears that our State and Navy Departments have instituted an investigation in order
to ascertain whether and to what extent it is true
that these mines constitute a menace to neutral
navigation. Our ministers at St. Petersburg and
Tokio have been instructed to look into the matter, and our naval attaches are supposed to be
engaged in finding out what truth there is in
these reports. This information, it is said, is to
be placed in the hands of the General Naval
Board, which is then to submit its views to the
President, who will, if deemed advisable, make
the proper representations to the belligerents.
See New York Sin for May 25, 1904
' This is according to the St. Petersburg cor-respondent of the London Express. See Chicago
Tribune for May 25, 1904. It appears, however
that \1. de Plehve. the late Russian Minister of
the Interior, in an official communication issued
privately, protested vigorously against the alleged action of the Japanese in laying floating
mines in the roadstead of Port Arthur, on the
ground that "the wholesale scattering of these
engines of destruction at points where they may
easily drift into the path of the marine commerce
of the world, to the common danger, can in no
wise be regarded as admissible." St. Petersburg

because of the immensely increased range of
modern guns, it is necessary to enlarge the
three mile limit for purposes of defence. It
is argued that "if ships can now lie eight or
ten miles away and yet reach the coast with
their projectiles, the defenders have a perfect
right to take such military measures as they
choose within the range of the enemy's
gtlns."
In reply to the Russian argument that
everything is permissable in war except those
things specifically forbidden by International
Law or Convention, it is sufficient to repeat
that, as in the case of the proposal to prohibit
or punish the use of wireless telegraphy on
the high seas or of any other new and unauthorized interference with the rights of neutrals, the presumption should always be in favor of neutral rights and privileges or of the
laws of peace. In order to render such acts
unla,x.ful, it is not necessary that theybe specifically forbidden; for their prima facie illegality may be deduced from general and fundamental principles. The sea is the common
property and highway of all nations. It is
open to belligerents and neutrals alike; but,
in caces in which there is a conflict of rights
or interests between the two, the presumption ought always to be in favor of
neutrals.
All authorities on International Law4 who
dispatch to the St. James Gazette, published in the
New York Times for May 26, 19oo.
St. Petersburg dispatch in Indianapolis Journai
for May 27. 1904.
' The following is a list, as complete as we have
been able to nake it, of those who are reported
as having expressed opinions on this subject:
Admiral Horsey, Sir William Walrond, M. P.,
Professor Moore of Columbia, Professor Woolsey of Yale, Professor T. E. Holland of Oxford,
Dr. Arnold Jarvis, Sir John Macdonnell, Sir Frederick Pollock, Bart. Rev. T. J. Lawrence, and M.
Pillet of the University of Paris. See London
and New York Times for May 24-28, 1904. For
the opinion of M. Pillet, see the Army and Navy
Journal for June 4 th.
For useful editorials or newspaper discussions.
see London and New York Times for May 24-31.
1904; New York Evening Post for May 24th, or
New York NVation for May 26th; New York Sun
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have thus far been quoted on this subject
are, so far as we are aware, unanimously of
the opinion that if either or both of the belligerents in this war have been guilty of deliberately sowing any portion of the high seas
with floating mines, they have, to put it
nildly, been guilty of a gross violation of the
laws of civilized warfare and of International
Law. The majority of these authorities
stem to be of the opinion that this is the case
whether the mines were anchored or intentionally set adrift outside of the three mile
limit. If neutrals were to suffer injury from
mines which are accidentally adrift or which
for May 26th; Indianapolis Journal for May 27th;
London Spectator and Saturday
ews for May
28th; Army and Navy Journal for May 28th and
June 4th; Scientific American for June 4th; Bradstreets for 'May 28th; Public Opinion for June 2d:
Berliner Nachricht for May 29th, and Die Woeche
for June 4 th.
"If these mines were deliberately floated into
waters where they would be liable to endanger
neutral ships, the act was undoubtedly inadmissable."
Professor Moore in New York Times
for May 25th. "Mines, whether anchored or intentionally set adrift in the Strait or Gulf of PeChi-li, beyond the coast sea limit, constitute an
undiscriminating attack upon neutral and belligerent alike, and are, therefore, illegitimate."
Professor Woolsey in the New York Times of the
same date.
"The laying of mines in the open sea beyond the
territorial waters would seem, not only inhuman,
but a breach of International Law and practice. . . . If it should prove true that the destruction of the Hatsuse was effected by a mine
wilfully placed in the open sea, ten miles from
land, the act appears to me one of wholesale
murder, and its perpetrator hostis huniani generis."
Admiral Horsey in London and New York Times
for May 24th.
"It is certain that no international usage sanctions the employment by one belligerent against
another, of mines or other secret contrivances
which would, without notice, render dangerous
the navigation of the high seas." Professor Holland in London and New York Times for May
25, 1904.
"Every belligerent is free, I take it, to destroy
his opponent's vessels in territorial waters or on
the high seas by all customary means, including
the use of mines. If, in an attempt to sink an
enemy's ship, he accidentally destroys neutral
property, there would be an unanswerable claim
for damages done on the high seas. . . . If, on
the other hand, and I hesitate to believe it, mines
are scattered broadcast in waterways outside territorial limits, neutrals who suffered would have
just cause to complain.
Such conduct, if per-
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have floated out into the open sea in consequence of having been insecurely fastened in
territorial waters, there would seem to be
good ground for a claim to damages; if, on
the other hand, it should be proved that the
mines had been deliberately placed there.
severe measures should be taken by neutral
Powers.
There can, of course, be no question, in the
present state of license in the use of submarine mines and torpedo boats' and other
highly destructive weapons of modern warfare but that states have a right to employ
these devices in their own harbors and territorial waters (as also in those of the enemy)
within the three mile limit, provided that the
life and property of neutrals and non-combatants be not carelessly or wantonly jeopardized.'

It is also probable that they have the

sisted in, would afford ground for remonstrance,
and, it might be, extreme measures."
Sir John
Macdoniell in London and New York Times fo'
May 25th.
"If a mine-field was deliberately created out in
the open ocean by the Russians, in such a position that it was as likely to destroy a peaceful
ineutral as an eneniv's warship, words fail to express the reprobation with which tile act must
be regarded. It is not only illegal, but cruel to
the highest degree."
Lawrence, War and Neutrality in the Far East, p. 107.
The only discordant note which we have detected in this general chorus of denunciation, at
least o the part of British and American authorities, is that voiced by Admiral Sir Cyprian
Bridge of the British Navy.
See London and
New York Tincs for May 31st. Officers of the
British Nasy are said to be opposed to any limitations upon the rights of naval warfare. Officials of our own War and Naval Departments do
not seeil to entertain such fears or prejudices.
See New York Tinies for May 25th.
1 Count Mouravieff's
proposal to "prohibit the
use, in naval warfare, of submarine torpedo-boats
or plungers, or other similar engines of destruc-

tion," and of "new explosives, or any powders
more powerful than those now in use," did not
neet with the approval of the majority of the
States represented at The Hague Conference.
See I-olls, Peace Conference, p. 26 and pp. 94-95.
This does not, however, affect neutral rights, as
the New York Aration (May 26th) seems to think.

Neutrals using or approaching these ports or
7

waters are entitled to notice or warning.

Wheth-

er such notice or warning should be general or
specific would probably

stances.

depend

upon

circum-
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right to use these weapons outside of territorial waters, i.e., on the high seas, with the
specific aim of injuring or destroying, or of
obstructing and impeding, the movements of
an enemy fleet, provided no injury which can
possibly be avoided result to neu-trals. 1
Centuries of practice show that belligercuts have an undoubted right to engage in
battle on the high seas. Neutrals must take
co.nizan e of this right and keep out of tne
rauige of the guns, as well as abstain fr jnl
impeding or obstructing the movements of
the vessels of either belligerent. Belligerents
cannot be held responsible for injury to a
neutral resulting from the latter's own carelessness or intrepidity. On the other hand
the belligerent should be held to strict account for any injury to neutrals which has resulted from his (the belligerent's) own carelessness or negligence, or from the use of
weapons, such as sub-marine mines,the existence of which, in that particular locality the
neutral had no knowledge. Even if notified,
neutrals could hardly be expected to take
cognizance of the existence of mines onl the
high seas within what has loosely been
termed the "theatre or zone of warlike operatilons." This would be a new and hitherto
unheard of restriction on the rights of neutrals which could not be imposed without an
international agreement, the enactment of
which should be resisted to the utmost by all
2
-seafaring nations.
In respect to the argument that, owing to
the increased range of modern artillery, the
three mile limit ought to be increased for purSuch injury, if not due to the fault of the neu-

tral, would undoubtedly justify a claim for damages. There is, I think, this difference between
the rights and privileges of neutrals on the high

seas and in territorial waters. On the high seas

it is a right, and the presumption is in favor of
the neutral; in territorial waters, it is a privilege,
and the presumption is in favor of the belligerent.
2 It may be that there are exceptions to the
principles enunciated above. For example, a
belligerent would probably have the right to de-

fend the anchorage of its vessels or to block up
the ships of the enemy by the use of mines.

poses of defence, it may be admitted that
there is much force in this contention. For
the protection of besieged fortresses like
Port Arthur, it would certainly seem only
fair to the besieged that the three mile limit
be extended in their behalf and that they be
allowed every means of defence (and these
irclude mines) permitted by the laws of warfare at any point within the range of modern
guns. Such is not the law2 however, and a
change in the law would require an interr.ational agreement or a complete change in
international practice.The three mile limit or the marine league
was originally based upon the principle first
clearly enunciated by the Dutch jurist Bynkershoek' in the early part of the eighteenth
century to the effect that the sovereignty or
jurisdiction of a State over the seas extends
no farther than its power to defend the sea
coast by force of arms extends-terrae
doninum finitur ubi finitur arnorum vis, i. e.
quousque tormenta explodunter. The range of
the cannon of that day seems to have been
about a marine league or three geographical
miles and this distance became the generally,
it not universally, recognized limit of territorial waters in the course of the eighteenth
'But even if this were the law, it would not
justify the placing of mines in the open sea, e. g.,
in the neighborhood of Wei-hai-Wei, or such acts
as the blowing up of the Hatsuse ten miles southeast of Port Arthur.
" The United States cannot admit that Spain,
without a formal concurrence of other nations,
can exercise exclusive sovereignty upon the open
sea beyond a line of three miles from the
coast. . . . It cannot be admitted that the mere
assertion of a sovereign, by an act of legislation,
however solemn, can have the effect to establish

and fix its external maritime jurisdiction.

This

right to a jurisdiction of three miles is derived,
not from his own decree, but from the law of
nations." Sec. Seward to M. Tessara, Dec. 16,
1862, and Aug. io, 1863.

See Wharton's Dig. I.,

§32, pp. 102-103.

De Domino Marls, c. 2. This work was published in 1702 or 1703. Cf. the vaguer statements
of Grotius (Lib. II, c. 3, §§ 13,14) and Vattel (Liv.
I, C. 23, §289).

Some Questions of InternationalLaw.
century. In the course of the nineteenth
century the rule of the marine league appears to have completely supplanted the
principle upon which it was originally based
and, instead of being extended to meet the
dcinands of new modern guns of ever-increasing range, it remained always the same
until it is now as fixed and unaltiraible as the laws of the Medes and the
Persians in spite of the protests of publicists
and the efforts of statesmen.1 There can he
nc doubt but that an extension of the' three
mile limit for all territorial purposes would be
h.ghly desirable.
The marine league no
longer satisfies the demands of modern requirements of defense. An extension to
nieet these requirements is certainly favored
by an ever-increasing majority of modern
publicists and has been strongly recommended by the Institute of International
'The majority of modern publicists appear to
favor an extension of the three-mile limit, but
some of them do not seem clearly to distinguish
between the nresent three-mile rule and the principle upon which it was originally based. Amongst

those who may be cited as favoring an extension
of the present rule or as holding that Bynkershock's principle is, or ought to be, the ruleof In-

ternational Law, are Beuntschli, §302; Fiore, §788;
Calvo, I., §356; P. Fodere, II., §§63off; Haute-

fouille, I., 89, 239; Ortolan, I., c. 8; Heffter, §75;
Rivier, I., Liv. III., c. 1, §io; Phillimore, Pt. III.,
c. 8; Hall, 41; Taylor, §247.
In i8o6 the American Government attempted
to obtain a recognition of a six-mile limit from
England, but refused to acknowledge the validity

of a claim of six miles made by Spain to the
coast of Cuba in 1863. But in the following year

(1864) Sec. Seward proposed a zone of five miles
to the British Legation at Washington. The

British Government has, however,

always in-

sisted upon the three-mile limit.
The three-mile limit has the sanction of a con-

siderable number of State and International Acts
or Conventions, e. g., the Russian Prize Rules of
1869, the British Territorial Waters Jurisdiction
Act of 1878, the North Sea Fisheries Convention
of 1882. the Convention of Constantinople relating to the Suez Canal of i889. For list of treaties, see Calvo, I., p. 479.

12The Institute of International

Law, at its
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It is highly desirable that these questions
and many others, more particularly those
relating to neutrality, contraband, and naval
warfare, be discussed and, if possible, settled, by an International Congress or Conference before or soon after the close of the
present war while the interest in such questions is still keen and the memory of its
ev,_nts fresh and vivid. In respect to the
questions immediately under discussion in
this paper, it may be said that any claims for
damages which may arise should be referred
to arbitration, preferably to the Hague Tribunal;3 but to wait until injury has actually
resulted to neutral individuals or to neutral
property before laying down the rule to be
followed in such cases would not seem to be
the part of wisdom or sound policy. Precautions should be taken in time and any evil
consequences which might follow upon uncertainty as to the rule ought to be averted,
if possible. In respect to the laying of submarine mines, the very least that neutral
States have a right to demand is that these
highly dangerous explosives be restricted to
territorial or belligerent waters; or if they are
placed upon the high seas for any purpose
whatsoever, that they be anchored in such a
way that they can not possibly become a
menace to neutral vessels. In all such cases
neutrals should receive due notice and the
mines should be carefully removed after the
special purpose for which they have been
placed there has been fulfilled.
favor of a zone of six marine miles for all territorial purposes and of permitting neutral States
to extend it still farther in time of war for the
purpose of defending its neutrality against a belligerent Power, provided the range of cannon was
not exceeded. The maritime Powers were recommended to hold an International Congress for
the purpose of adopting these and other rules
but no such Congress has ever been held. See
Annuaire de l'Institut de Droit International for
1894-95, pp. 283-331.

Paris session in 1894, after an exhaustive discus-

The Hague Tribunal is an international court
for the decision of actual disputes between na-

(there was no division of opinion as to the de-

tions.

>irability of extending the three-mile limit) in

legislate in the ordinary sense.

sion of this question, gave a decisive majority

It has power to declare law, but not to

